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equity market trends (3) institutional environments and the degree of the economic 
development of the countries in which the transaction participants operate; and 
(4) selected payment method and motive for entering the transaction in regard to space 
and time dimensions of bid premium. Examining the sample of 783 merger and 
acquisition transactions at the global economy level, the research explores the importance 
and range of time and space determinants of bid premiums in M&A transactions. 
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dependent on the observed timeframe, i.e. we find evidence of information “leakage” prior to 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Rarely does an issue in the area of corporate finance attracts so much continuous 
attention and interest as does the matter of mergers and acquisitions (“M&As”). In both 
academic and business circles debates are constantly held on the underlying motives for 
such transactions and whether they are justified, whether the amounts paid are adequate, 
who wins and who loses and what information regarding a particular M&A may be revealed 
from the response of the market prices to the M&A announcement. A particularly interesting 
series of questions arise upon analysis of the phenomenon of information “leakage” into the 
market prior to the official M&A announcement as well as whether the market perceives the 
price offered for the target’s shares as realistic. However, the question of all questions is why 
the market is so skeptical and strict in anticipation of the successfulness of those transactions.  
What is substantially typical of the largest number of M&As is payment of an acquisition 
premium (the so-called bid premium), which is the difference between the price offered by 
the bidder and the currently trading price of the target’s shares. The empirical research 
suggest that the average bid premium ranges between 20% and 40% (Goergen & Renneboog, 
2004). The premiums offered by bidder to take over control over the target significantly raise 
the market expectations and make the market more rigid in comparison to some other 
transaction types. In fact, when a bidder offers a price above the target’s share price, the bidder 
must justify the premium paid through the post-transaction integration, through exceeding the 
market expectations and doing something that the target was unable to do on its own. This 
exclusively relates to the synergy effects. So, the market is strict and skeptical about M&A 
transaction success, primarily because the investors are skeptical whether the bidder will be 
able to firstly conserve the value created within the target prior to the transaction, and on top of 
that, succeed in creating the expected synergy effects (Sirower & Sahni, 2006).  
Now that we have considered the main reasons for the market’s caution about M&A 
transactions, let us state here that different theories address different determinants of 
M&A transaction successfulness. For instance, upon identification of determinants for the 
bid premiums in international M&As, the classical M&A theory focuses on the factors 
such as risk diversification, increased operational effectiveness and change in the market 
power. On the other hand, the neoclassical theory emphasizes changes in the shareholder 
rights and changes in the features of the corporate governance resulting from the bidder and 
the target operating in different institutional environments (Bhagat, Malhotra & Zhu, 2011). 
Xie et al. (2017) find that “institutional and regulatory framework, tax provisions, economic 
performance, financial markets development, investor protection, geographical setting and 
cultural factors have differential effects on the inward and outward capital flows”. Further, 
they find that “institutional dichotomous issues like the ruling political party influence, 
government intervention, higher levels of corruption, and erratic behavior of bureaucracy 
have detrimental effects on the completion likelihood of publicly announced acquisition 
transactions”.  
What makes the field of mergers and acquisitions dynamic and vibrant at all times is 
the fact that characteristics of these transactions are not universal and static but varying in 
terms of both space and time. The intention of this paper is to highlight the space and time 
dimension of M&A transactions.  
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW  
Characteristics of M&A transactions may vary depending on the economic and 
institutional environments in which the transactions are performed. Rossi and Volpin (2004) 
confirm that target companies operating in the United States realize statistically significantly 
higher abnormal returns against the comparable companies operating in other markets. In fact, 
it is identified that the average bid premium in the US-based transactions is by 7 percentage 
points higher than the premiums paid in the non-US transactions. Although it has been 
established that in the US-based M&A transactions statistically significant synergy effects are 
realized, it turns out that those are not sufficient to account for the differences in bid premiums 
between the US entities and entities operating in other markets. This means that the explanation 
for bid premium differences ought to be sought in different legislation and different scope of 
shareholder rights which are closely related to stronger bargaining power.  
The main distinction about the US market in comparison to the other countries is higher 
competition in the market for corporate control reflected in the higher volume of M&A 
transactions and more diverse and potentially more efficient defense measures against hostile 
takeovers. M&A activities are considerably higher in volume in the countries with better 
investor protection, which is regarded as the key prerequisite of an active market for 
corporate control (Rossi & Volpin, 2004). The final conclusion hence could be that in the 
USA there is a higher level of protection of target shareholders than in the practices of other 
countries, which improves their bargaining power and enables higher bid premiums and the 
abnormal returns of the targets than those realized by the targets in other markets.  
It is interesting that the conclusions reached are somewhat modified if the abnormal 
returns of the bidders are analyzed. Alexandridis et al. (2010) show that bidders operating in 
the markets of Continental Europe, Australia, Japan and other countries with relatively low 
competition in the market for corporate control realize significantly higher returns than the 
bidders operating in the USA, Canada, and the UK. This is in line with the thesis that high 
competition in the market for corporate control, although having a positive impact on the 
returns of the targets, may have negative ultimate implications on the returns of the bidders. 
In fact, the high competition levels in the market for corporate control causes bidders to 
increase gradually the bid premiums offered for target takeover, resulting in payment of 
excessive premiums, which are often not justified by commensurately higher synergy effects.  
In order to measure the competition level in the market for corporate control 
Alexandridis et al. (2010) focus on listed target companies involved in the completed M&A 
transactions in the specific year relative to the total number of listed companies operating in 
the market under analysis. The highest competition levels in the market for corporate control 
are recorded in the US, the UK and Canada since these are countries with the largest 
numbers of listed companies that are subject to control takeover in the specific year. The 
average bid premium values identified in those markets equal 45.79%, 42.02% and 37.01%, 
respectively, whereas in the rest of the world the average bid premium recorded in the same 
period is merely 31.91%. Moreover, the abnormal returns of the bidders operating in Europe 
(excluding the UK), Japan, the rest of Asia, Australia and Oceania, South Africa and Latin 
America are non-negative and statistically significantly higher than those of the bidders from 
the countries with the largest volume of M&A transactions.   
Ylmaz and Tanyeri (2016) find that, viewed on the global level, M&A transactions 
create value with the cumulative average abnormal return of 1.7%. When it comes to the 
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differences in respect of three-day cumulative abnormal returns identified between the 
companies in developed countries and companies operating in developing countries, results 
are somewhat different from Alexandridis et al. (2010). In terms of the results relating to the 
returns realized by the target shareholders, there are no deviations from the above discussed 
results. The results show that CAR of the targets operating in developed countries equals 
8.1%, while that of the targets in developing countries is as low as 2.8%. While the 
difference between CARs realized by the targets was anticipated, the research shows that 
returns realized by the bidder shareholders are also higher for companies operating in 
developed countries, although the difference is of a much less scale than the difference 
identified for the targets
.
 One of the explanations for the divergent results of the aforesaid 
two studies in terms of abnormal returns realized by the bidders is the use of different event 
windows for measurement of cumulative abnormal returns. Since the developing countries 
are characterized by a slower pace of the market adaptation to new information (lower 
market efficiency), the use of shorter event windows for CAR measurement might cause 
underestimation of the returns realized by the bidder shareholders upon transaction 
announcement. Relaying on this finding we are introducing time frame as one of the key 
features of our bid premium analysis.  
With regard to the generation and distribution of the total gains realized in M&A 
transactions, results of the sample studies encompassing international M&As ought to be 
considered, especially those where companies operating in the countries with developed 
market economies were observed as bidders and companies operating in developing 
countries as targets. The results of related studies show that shareholders commonly realize 
positive combined returns in such transactions, whereby the gains are unevenly distributed in 
favor of the bidders (Bellotti & Williams, 2008).  
The increasing volume of international M&As involving companies from developing 
countries as bidders made some researchers deal with the characteristics of such transactions 
in more detail. The highest growth in value of such transactions of as much as 392% was 
identified in the period from 2004 through 2008. In 2006 consulting firm BSG published a 
study demonstrating that 100 most successful companies from developing countries are 
constantly strengthening their global influence by increasing their presence in various 
industries, with such influence strengthening realized not exclusively through export as one 
of the possible channels, but rather through the ever growing volume of international M&A 
transactions in which these companies appear as bidders (Bhagat & Malhotra, 2011).  
In general, the main drivers of the bidders from developing countries in targeting 
companies from the countries with developed market economies are classified into two 
major groups: (1) acquisition of strategically valuable resources
 
such as technology, brand, 
managerial talent, distribution channels and natural resources and (2) avoidance of 
institutional restrictions existing in their countries of origin. These transactions create value 
on the average, where the cultural differences between the bidders and the targets pose the 
most significant barrier to value creation. In fact, in instances of international M&As, the 
capacity to learn and the level of adaptability to a new cultural environment are crucial 
determinants of success. Realization of abnormal returns is in line with the so-called 
bootstrapping hypothesis assuming that bidders realize positive abnormal returns upon 
transaction announcement where the quality of the target’s corporate governance system is 
on a higher level. It is assumed that, in such an instance, the bidder enters into the transaction, 
among other reasons, in order to adopt and implement the higher corporate governance 
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quality standards the target has in place (Bhagat et al., 2011; De Buele and Sels, 2016, Li 
et al., 2016). Brock (2005) also finds that “the cultural match or mismatch between the parties 
in international M&As shape their ability to successfully integrate and share resources, which in 
turn affects the ability to realize synergies”. 
Apart from institutional environment and economic development of M&A transaction 
participants, payment method and motives for entering the deal are important bid premium 
determinants.  
Numerous empirical studies investigating the impact of the selected payment method on 
the bid premium amounts and successfulness of M&A transactions have not produced 
uniform conclusions. Great many studies conducted in the USA almost unanimously found 
that transactions entirely financed with shares result in negative returns and low performance 
to the bidders. On the other hand, studies conducted in Europe demonstrate that share-based 
financing of transactions may result in positive and sometimes statistically significant returns 
to the bidders. Similarly, certain authors claim that higher bid premiums positively correlate 
to the predominant cash payments (De La Bruslerie, 2013). Chatterjee and Kuenzi (2001) 
find that announcements of M&A transactions involving bidders with surplus cash funds 
ought to bring about negative returns to the bidder shareholders. The payment method is 
frequently associated with the level of the shareholder legal protection. The probability of 
control takeover being financed entirely with cash declines as the level of the shareholder 
protection in the target’s country of origin rises, which is explained by the fact that the high 
levels of shareholder protection increase the availability of financing with equity 
instruments. On the other hand, in the countries with low levels of shareholder protection, 
shareholders will be more willing to accept offers for payment in cash than share-based 
payment offers (Rossi & Volpin, 2004).  
Based on empirical and theoretical findings most commonly expressed motive for 
entering an M&A transaction is creation of value, which may be realized through synergy 
effects arising from either the strategic fit (operating synergy) or through utilization of the 
financial benefits from the combination (financial synergy). Although both types of 
synergy effects are perceived as desirable, it is expected that an existing strategic fit 
between the bidder and the target increases readiness to pay higher bid premiums. In this 
regard, a number of empirical studies point out that takeovers realized within the same 
industries enable realization of higher returns than takeovers aimed at business portfolio 
diversification. Gupta and Misra (2007) and Golubov et al. (2016) actually confirm the 
economic theory views that expansion into the related industries enables more successful 
and faster activation of synergy effects in comparison to that of diversification. 
In line with the previous research results that are presented in literature review section 
and our research objective the following hypotheses will be tested: 
H1: There are statistically significant differences between bid premiums calculated 1 day 
and 30 days prior to/after the official M&A announcement. 
H2: There are statistically significant differences in the bid premium amounts calculated 
prior to/after the official M&A announcement depending on the institutional environment and 
economic development of the countries the participants in international M&As come from.  
H3: There are statistically significant differences in the bid premium amounts calculated 
prior to/after the official M&A announcement depending on selected payment method. 
H4: There are statistically significant differences in the bid premium amounts calculated 
prior to/after the official M&A announcement depending on bidders act as strategic or financial 
buyers.  
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3. DATA AND SAMPLE  
In our research we create the sample by using the data from the Mergermarket database 
that includes mergers and acquisitions at the global economy level, with individual values of 
above USD 5 million. The analysis focuses on M&A transactions announced in years 2015 
and 2016, two periods relevant for examination of M&A transactions characteristics and 
their behavior in regard to the condition and trends identified in the equity markets 
throughout the world. In fact, we identify three periods and regard them as three sub-
samples. The first, from January 1, 2015 to June 12, 2015 is a period prior to the general 
decline of the investor confidence (pre-confidence decline period). The second period, from 
June 12, 2015 to February 12, 2016, is a period when in almost all stock markets around the 
world the investor confidence decreased and the stock exchange indices recorded the most 
severe drops since the beginning of the global financial crisis in 2008 (confidence decline 
period). Such a trend was not identified in the USA only, where the most significant stock 
exchange indices recorded either no decline at all or decline much less severe than what 
happened in other markets. The third period, from February 12, 2016 to December 31, 2016, 
is a period of recovery and the investor confidence growth, i.e., a period of positive trends 
identified in all significant stock markets in the world (confidence recovery period).  
As previously highlighted, in the second half of 2015 a drastic fall in share prices 
occurred in almost all large equity markets in the world as a result of a number of adverse 
events that took place in the global economy that year which had extremely negative effects 
on the global economic trends. One of the key circumstances that stopped the period of the 
steady increase in share prices in the global stock markets was the crash of the Chinese stock 
market that began in June 2015. From June 12 to August 24, 2015 the Shanghai Composite 
Index fell by 38% despite the efforts of the Chinese Government to prevent the negative 
tendencies in the economy. In addition, due to its default on liabilities toward IMF, on June 
30, 2015 Greece declared bankruptcy. Among factors that led to the undoubtedly largest 
drop of the share prices after 2008, there were a plummet of oil prices, Chinese currency 
devaluation, decrease in investments in developing countries and investor expectations 
regarding the discontinuation of the expansionary monetary policy of the US Federal Reserve 
that would be expected to lead to a rise in general interest rate levels. Unlike 2015, which 
featured dropping share prices in the markets throughout the world, 2016 was a year of 
recovery and stabilization of the financial markets. As from February 2016, all the stock 
exchange indices recorded continuous rise apart from the short-term crash immediately before 
and after the UK referendum (Brexit). Increase in oil prices, recovery of the demand in the 
commodity and services markets, positive political trends in some countries and consistent 
policies of cheap money implemented by almost all central banks are some of the key factors 
that led to the recovery of the financial markets throughout the world and created positive 
investor expectations regarding the future performances of the major world economies.  
The sample includes transactions announced during 2015 and 2016 and completed by 
the end of Q1 2017. Given that the focus of our analysis is on target share prices upon the 
M&A transaction announcement, the sample includes only transactions with targets in the 
form of public companies whose shares are publicly traded and whose prices are 
disclosed at the stock exchange. All transactions financed with debt instruments or hybrid 
equity instruments are excluded from the sample as well as all the transactions for which 
there is no full set of data required for the analysis. Out of the total number of the 
announced transactions, 834 transactions meet all the pre-defined criteria.  
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Due to the specificities of operations of the financial institutions in comparison to the real 
sector companies, we exclude from the sample all transactions involving financial sector 
entities as targets. In addition, in order to reduce the influence of extreme bid premium values 
on the statistical testing results, the sample is winsorized by 1% at both the left and right 
distribution tail, separately for the bid premiums calculated prior and after the official merger 
announcement. Thus the final sample of 783 M&A transactions is obtained. Viewed per the 
three previously defined periods relevant for our research: in the first period 218 transactions 
meeting all of the required criteria were identified, 312 transactions were identified in the 
second period and 253 M&A transactions were identified in the third period. 
Beside numerous approaches that may be used in examining the characteristics and 
successfulness of M&A transactions, the methodological event study approach stands out in 
literature as particularly suitable (Bruner, 2002). Adnan and Hossain (2016) accentuate some 
benefits of event studies such as: “(1) short-term event study can screen the influence of outside 
factors to large extent; (2) data are easy to get publicly, allowing study on large sample; and 
(3) it is relatively objective public assessment”. Upon definition of the methodology framework 
for the research our starting point relies on the powerful influence of the assumption of the 
semi-strong equity market efficiency on economic theory, whereby the existing share prices 
always incorporate and reflect all publicly available and relevant information. This hypothesis 
provides a theoretical foundation for the dominant implementation of the cumulative abnormal 
return methodology. Given that the contemporary empirical studies more and more often 
question whether the dominant use of CAR methodology is justified and that, according to 
some authors (Lim, Brooks & Kim, 2008), the equity market efficiency form is not unalterable 
in time but may be changed from a pre-confidence decline, to a crisis and confidence recovery 
periods, in our research, although we remained within the event study field, we applied a 
slightly different approach. In this paper we examine the informative content of the bid 
premium and identify differences in the value of the bid premium depending on: (1) the 
observed timeframe; (3) characteristics of the market for corporate control in which the target 
operates and the degree of the economic development of the countries in which the transaction 
participants operate; and (4) selected payment method and motive for entering the transaction in 
regard to space and time dimensions of bid premiums. 
4. RESEARCH RESULTS 
4.1. Bid premium behavior before and after the official M&A announcement 
When the sample is taken on the whole, the expected results are obtained showing that at 
the significance level of 5% the average bid premium calculated 30 days prior to the official 
M&A announcement is statistically significantly higher than the average bid premium 
calculated 1 day prior to the official transaction announcement. Such a result is in line with 
Keown and Pinkerton (1981) who find that “stock prices react to future mergers about one 
month before announcements”. There are some authors such as Halpern (1973) and Mandelker 
(1974) who find “the price run-up may start several months before M&A announcements” but 
in our paper we are not considering price run-ups that may occur more than one month before 
official M&A announcement. While some researchers believe the run-up is caused by market 
anticipation or toehold acquisition, Tang et al. (2016) find “neither of the two is able to explain 
the target stock price run-up prior to M&A announcements. Instead, variables that are 
associated with unreported insider trading are significantly associated with the run-up”. 
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Anyway, the use of bid premium calculated 1 day prior to the official transaction announcement 
for the purposes of analyzing the expected synergy effects and abnormal returns upon 
transaction announcement could lead to their inadequate evaluation.  
If, on the other hand, testing is performed on each individual sub-sample defined, the results 
obtained are not uniform. In the confidence decline and confidence recovery period, the results 
arrived at, match the results obtained for the entire sample. However, in the period preceding 
the plummet of the share prices in almost all global stock markets (confidence pre-decline 
period), the results show that there is no statistically significant difference between the bid 
premiums calculated 30 days and 1 day prior the official merger announcement. For the sake of 
consistency, we elected to use the bid premium calculated 30 days prior to the official merger 
announcement in each of the three observed periods for the purposes of examining the bid 
premium informative content. 
The bid premium calculated subsequent to the official M&A announcement is used as a 
measure of the market response to the information reaching the market with regard to the 
transaction announcement. If the bidder appropriately measured the expected benefits from the 
transaction and defined the appropriate bid premium amount accordingly, and if, additionally, 
there is no uncertainty in respect of the transaction completion at the price defined in the offer, 
the market ought to equal the target share price to the share price defined in the offer. 
Statistically, this would mean that the bid premium calculated after the official M&A 
announcement should not be statistically significantly different from zero. 
We first test whether there is a statistically significant difference between the values of the 
bid premiums calculated 1 day and 30 days after the official M&A announcement. Thereby we 
want to investigate whether the character of the market response to the transaction 
announcement changes with the passage of time and whether the market changes its initial 
“attitude” regarding the justification of the price offered in a particular transaction. Testing is 
first conducted on the entire sample and thereafter on each of the three sub-samples. In both 
instances identical results are obtained – there is no statistically significant difference between 
the amounts of 1-day and 30-day post announcement bid premiums. Naturally, this still tells 
little about what attitude the market assumed or whether the attitude changes over a period 
longer than a month following the official transaction announcement. The results obtained are 
provided in table 1. 
Table 1 Bid premium trends prior and after to transaction announcement 
Paired Samples Test Mean Std. Deviation T statistic Sig. (2-tailed) 
For the entire sample     
Bid Premia Share Price -1, -30 -0.05684 0.31190 -5.100 0.000 
Bid Premia Share Price +1, +30 -0.01134 0.35101 -0.904 0.366 
Pre-confidence decline period     
Bid Premia Share Price -1, -30 -0.05280 0.47005 -1.658 0.099 
Bid Premia Share Price +1, +30 -0.00646 0.12170 -0.784 0.434 
Crisis period     
Bid Premia Share Price -1, -30 -0.03750 0.24832 -2.667 0.008 
Bid Premia Share Price +1, +30 -0.00595 0.13537 -0.776 0.438 
Confidence recovery period     
Bid Premia Share Price -1, -30 -0.08418 0.18519 -7.230 0.000 
Bid Premia Share Price +1, +30 -0.02220 0.58890 -0.600 0.549 
Source: Authors’ calculation 
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In order to examine the character of the market response to the transaction announcement 
we test whether the average bid premiums calculated at +1 and +30 points in time statistically 
significantly differ from zero, which would mean the market’s perception of the prices defined 
in the offer is unjustifiably high, i.e., that the bid premium value is above its realistic value 
(results are presented in table 2). When viewed per sub-sample, the testing results on the first 
two periods are identical, the average bid premiums at +1 and +30 points in time are 
statistically significantly higher than zero. On one end, these results may be interpreted in the 
context of the market’s inability to incorporate the new information in the target share prices in 
the relatively short period of 30 days only. On the other, the explanation may be found in the 
fact that, despite the adequate and timely market response, the target share prices do not reach 
the level of the prices offered because the bidder offered an unjustifiably high premium in a 
particular transaction or there is uncertainty in respect of the transaction completion at the price 
defined in the offer. We decided to use the bid premium calculated 30 days after the transaction 
for measurement of the market response to the merger announcement. The main reason for this 
choice was the fact that we used the bid premium calculated 30 days before the official 
transaction announcement to measure the expected synergy effects on the bid premium amount. 
Table 2 Bid premium and the market response to the transaction announcement 
 One Sample Statistics (t=0) Mean Std. Deviation T statistic Sig. (2-tailed) 
For the entire sample     
Bid Premia Share Price +1 0.0461 0.18289 7.051 0.000 
Bid Premia Share Price +30 0.0574 0.38695 4.153 0.000 
Pre-confidence decline period     
Bid Premia Share Price +1 0.0344 0.18680 2.722 0.007 
Bid Premia Share Price +30 0.0409 0.24718 2.443 0.015 
Crisis period     
Bid Premia Share Price +1 0.0608 0.17368 6.179 0.000 
Bid Premia Share Price +30 0.0667 0.19295 6.106 0.000 
Confidence recovery period     
Bid Premia Share Price +1 0.0380 0.18992 3.186 0.002 
Bid Premia Share Price +30 0.0602 0.60476 1.584 0.114 
Source: Authors’ calculation 
4.2. Bid premium – institutional environment and the degree of the economic 
development of the countries in which the transaction participants operate  
Due to complexity of the international M&As, we decide to focus on this particular type 
of transactions and investigate if there are any differences in the bid premium amounts 
depending on the economic development of the countries of origins of the transaction 
participants. To this end, based on the United Nations’ classification we made four sub-
samples: sub-sample one, comprised of transactions involving both bidders and targets from 
developed countries; sub-sample two, comprised of transactions involving both bidders and 
targets from developing countries; sub-sample three with bidders from developed countries 
and targets from developing countries; and sub-sample four with bidders from developing 
countries and targets from developed countries.  
The testing results demonstrate there are statistically significant differences in the bid 
premium amounts calculated prior to the official merger announcement depending on the 
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level of economic development of the countries the participants in international M&As 
come from. It is interesting that the highest average bid premium of as much as 37% was 
identified within the subsample of transactions involving bidders from developing countries 
and targets from developed economies. Such a high average bid premium amount is in line 
with the previously stated theoretical assumptions and empirical evidence from (Li et al., 
2016; De Buele and Sels, 2016; Bhagat et al., 2011). Almost identical average bid premium 
of 36.7% was identified, as expected, in the transactions where both bidders and targets 
come from developed countries. Somewhat lower average bid premium (33%) was recorded 
in the transactions involving bidders from developed and targets from developing countries, 
which may be due to lower synergy effects expected in such transactions and weaker bargaining 
power of the target shareholders. Definitely the lowest average bid premiums of only 18% 
were recorded in transactions involving both the bidder and the targets from developing 
countries. The average bid premiums presented above range between 18% and 37% which is 
almost in line with Goergen and Renneboog (2004) 20% - 40% bid premium range. 
Next we test if the average bid premiums recorded after the official M&A announcement 
are statistically significantly different from zero. We are interested in the differences, if any, 
in the market responses to the transaction announcement depending on the economic 
development of the country. The testing results show that, in all instances save the one where 
both bidders and targets operate in the developing countries, the bid premiums calculated 
upon the transaction announcement are statistically significantly above zero. The highest 
average bid premium (9%) was identified in the transactions involving bidders from 
developing and targets from developed economies. As it was previously found that the 
highest takeover premiums are offered in transactions of this type, the question is whether 
bidders from developing countries overestimate benefits from penetration in the developed 
markets and/or have insufficiently strong bargaining power in such circumstances, which all 
together results in unjustifiably high bid premiums offered and consequent overpayment of 
transactions. On the other hand, insufficiently positive market response to the announcement 
of this type of transactions may be a consequence of the market’s skepticism about success 
of the post-merger integration due to cultural differences and insufficient absorptive 
capacities of the bidders. In transactions involving both bidders and targets from developed 
countries, the identified overpayment may be due to the high competition levels in the 
market for corporate control Alexandridis et al. (2010), while the transactions involving 
bidders from developed and targets from developing countries the high bid premiums at +30 
may be caused by both overpayment and the fact that the developing countries are 
characterized by a slower pace of adaptation to new information coming to the market 
(lower market efficiency). On the other end, the average bid premium +30 in transactions 
involving both the bidders and the targets from developing countries is identified as not 
statistically significantly different from zero, which leads to a conclusion on adequately 
measured prices offered for takeover of the target shares. It is particularly interesting that in 
this group of transactions we find a negative average bid premium at +30 point in time (-
1.4%), which mean that these transactions are not only not  overpaid but that the premiums 
offered are too low which is in line with Ang and Ismail (2015).  
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Table 3 Bid premium in regard to economic development of the paticipants’ countries 
ANOVA F statistic Sig. (2-tailed) 
For the entire sample   
Bid Premia Share Price -30 9.347 0.000 
Bid Premia Share Price +30 1.545 0.201 
 
One Sample Statistics (t=0) Mean Std. 
Deviation 
T statistic Sig.  
(2-tailed) 
For the entire sample     
Bid Premia Share Price +30 (segment 1) 0.0606 0.41491 3.470 0.001 
Bid Premia Share Price +30 (segment 2) 
Bid Premia Share Price +30 (segment 3) 
Bid Premia Share Price +30 (segment 4) 
0.0114 
0.0499 
0.1434 
0.02329 
0.08002 
0.42288 
0.489 
3.414 
2.492 
0.625 
0.002 
0.016 
Source: Authors’ calculation 
4.3. Bid premium - payment methods and motives for M&A transactions 
We first test whether there are statistically significant differences in the bid premium 
amounts calculated prior to the official transaction announcement depending on whether the 
transaction is financed with cash, shares or a combination thereof. The results show that there 
are statistically significant differences in the bid premium amounts per payment method, where 
the highest average bid premium is identified in cash-financed transactions, and the lowest in 
entirely share-financed ones. This result correlates to Goergen and Renneboog (2004) who 
claim that higher bid premiums positively correlate to the predominant cash payments.  
However, the testing results per sub-sample suggest that statistically significant 
differences in the bid premium amounts per selected payment method arise exclusively in 
the crisis period, while no such differences are identified in the pre-confidence decline 
and confidence recovery periods. The stronghold for this result we find in the different 
level of M&A participants’ legal protection relative to general market trends. Shah and 
Arora (2014) finds that the level of investor protection is lessened in the period of crisis.  
On the other hand, analysing the market response to the transaction announcement, the 
results obtained at the entire sample level show that the average bid premium calculated 
30 days after the transaction announcement is statistically significantly above zero for 
each of the three payment methods. However, at the level of individual period, the results 
were heterogeneous. In fact, the results demonstrate that the prices offered by bidders in 
cash-financed transactions are perceived as adequate on the average in both the pre-
confidence decline period and confidence recovery period, while in the crisis period such 
prices are perceived as overestimated. However, the results suggest that, in instances of 
share-financed transactions and those financed with cash and shares combined to some 
extent, the market perceives the prices offered as unrealistically high, irrespective of the 
current situation in the equity market which is in line with Gupta and Misra (2007). Here we 
need to underline another important finding, that in the crisis period, target share prices 
remain below the price offered after the transaction announcement irrespective of the 
selected payment method. Among other things, this may be a consequence of the market’s 
higher skepticism during the crisis period as to whether the transactions announced will be 
completed.   
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Table 4 Bid premium in regard to selected payment method 
Descriptives / ANOVA Mean-cash Mean-
equity 
Mean-
mixed 
F statistic Sig.  
(2-tailed) 
For the entire sample      
Bid Premia Share Price -30 0.3570 0.2655 0.2911 3.968 0.019 
Bid Premia Share Price +30 0.0408 0.1008 0.0963 1.801 0.166 
Pre-confidence decline period      
Bid Premia Share Price -30 0.3079 0.2335 0.2877 0.652 0.522 
Bid Premia Share Price +30 0.0187 0.0842 0.787 1.619 0.200 
Crisis period      
Bid Premia Share Price -30 0.3675 0.2648 0.2465 2.973 0.053 
Bid Premia Share Price +30 0.0449 0.1414 0.1148 6.066 0.003 
Confidence recovery period      
Bid Premia Share Price -30 0.3812 0.2966 0.3640 0.824 0.440 
Bid Premia Share Price +30 0.0525 0.0741 0.0951 0.067 0.935 
 
One Sample Statistics (t=0) T statistic Sig. (2-tailed) 
For the entire sample   
Bid Premia Share Price +30 (Cash) 2.210 0.028 
Bid Premia Share Price +30 (Equity) 4.460 0.000 
Bid Premia Share Price +30 (Mixed) 6.359 0.000 
Pre-confidence decline period   
Bid Premia Share Price +30 (Cash) 0.840 0.402 
Bid Premia Share Price +30 (Equity) 2.012 0.051 
Bid Premia Share Price +30 (Mixed) 3.646 0.001 
Crisis period   
Bid Premia Share Price +30 (Cash) 3.612 0.000 
Bid Premia Share Price +30 (Equity) 4.132 0.000 
Bid Premia Share Price +30 (Mixed) 4.754 0.000 
Confidence recovery period   
Bid Premia Share Price +30 (Cash) 1.042 0.299 
Bid Premia Share Price +30 (Equity) 1.779 0.083 
Bid Premia Share Price +30 (Mixed) 2.576 0.017 
Source: Authors’ calculation 
In the next instance, we focus on the motive for entering the M&A transactions as one 
of the key determinants of bid premium value. We test the hypothesis that bid premiums 
calculated prior to the official M&A announcement involving strategic buyers as bidders 
are statistically significantly higher than such transactions with financial buyers as 
bidders. The hypothesis is confirmed at the level of the entire sample (all three periods 
jointly). Such a result unambiguously suggests that acquisition strategy (expansion or 
diversification) has an impact on the bid premium amount as well as on the willingness to 
offer higher premiums. These higher premiums should be justified by the “core business” 
strengthening, strategic fit activation and gaining or increasing of the competitive 
advantage in the process of post-merger integration.   
When hypothesis is tested on the sub-samples of pre-confidence decline and confidence 
recovery periods, the results obtained are identical to those for the entire sample. However, 
when we observe transactions performed in the crisis period, we come to a conclusion that there 
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is no statistically significant difference between the bid premiums calculated prior to the M&A 
announcement in instances of strategic buyers as bidders and those of financial buyers as 
bidders. This indicates that in periods featuring negative trends in the stock markets the values 
of operating and financial synergies become convergent. A relevant study of J.P. Morgan that 
was focused on the research of M&A characteristics in the crisis periods found that, even in 
such circumstances, due to a more difficult access to the stock market and due to higher capital 
costs, companies much more turn to achievement of financial synergies (J.P.Morgan, 2009). 
When it comes to the market response to the transaction announcement depending on 
the primary acquisition motive, viewed at the entire sample level, the market makes no 
distinction between strategic and financial buyers and perceives both types of bidders as 
offering unjustifiably high bid premiums. However, somewhat different conclusions 
imposed on us upon separate testing of the sub-samples. In similarity to the analysis of the 
impact of the payment method, here as well the market sees prices offered by bidders as 
unrealistically high in the crisis period, irrespective of the motive for entering the 
transaction. This may be attributable to the higher market skepticism as to whether the 
announced transactions will be realized. Moreover, upon respective analyses of the pre-
confidence decline period and the recovery period, we observe that the +30 bid premium 
was statistically significantly above zero only when strategic buyers appeared as bidders. 
On the other hand, in transactions involving financial buyers as bidders, the bid premium 
values did not differ statistically significantly from zero. Therefore, we may ultimately 
Table 5 Bid premium in regard to payment method and the motive for entering the transaction 
Independent Samples Test Mean-
strategic 
Mean-
financial 
T statistic Sig. (2-tailed) 
For the entire sample     
Bid Premia Share Price -30 0.3532 0.2632 3.255 0.001 
Bid Premia Share Price +30 0.0663 0.0246 2.026 0.043 
Pre-confidence decline period     
Bid Premia Share Price -30 0.3103 0.2026 2.356 0.021 
Bid Premia Share Price +30 0.0510 -0.0054 1.292 0.198 
Crisis period     
Bid Premia Share Price -30 0.3517 0.2857 1.303 0.194 
Bid Premia Share Price +30 0.0692 0.0565 0.465 0.643 
Confidence recovery period     
Bid Premia Share Price -30 0.3961 0.2780 2.167 0.031 
Bid Premia Share Price +30 0.0769 0.0120 0.745 0.457 
 
One Sample Statistics (t=0) T statistic Sig. (2-tailed) 
For the entire sample   
Bid Premia Share Price +30 (Strategic) 3.836 0.000 
Bid Premia Share Price +30 (Financial) 2.192 0.030 
Pre-confidence decline period   
Bid Premia Share Price +30 (Strategic) 2.545 0.012 
Bid Premia Share Price +30 (Financial) -0.339 0.737 
Crisis period   
Bid Premia Share Price +30 (Strategic) 5.755 0.000 
Bid Premia Share Price +30 (Financial) 2.171 0.034 
Confidence recovery period   
Bid Premia Share Price +30 (Strategic) 1.507 0.134 
Bid Premia Share Price +30 (Financial) 1.234 0.221 
Source: Authors’ calculation 
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conclude that the strategically oriented bidders overestimate the expected synergy effects 
on the average and offer unrealistically high premiums irrespective of the current stock 
market trends, while bidders focused on financial synergies on the average, save in the 
crisis periods, adequately value the premiums they offer for takeover of control. 
5. CONCLUSION 
The research demonstrates that in the crisis and confidence recovery periods there are 
phenomena of the information “leakage” and insider trading in the market, which cause 
underestimations of the bid premium amounts calculated immediately before the official 
transaction announcement. However, analysis of the transactions announced in the pre-
confidence decline period show that there is no statistically significant difference between 
the bid premium calculated 30 days and those calculated 1 day before the official transaction 
announcement. Upon analysis of the market response to the official transaction 
announcement, the conclusion arrived at suggests that, irrespective of the current stock 
market trends, the target shares do not reach the price defined by the takeover bid. On one 
end, these results may be interpreted in the context of the market’s inability to incorporate 
the new information in the target share prices in the relatively short period of 30 days only. 
On the other, the explanation may be found in the fact that, despite the adequate and timely 
market response, the target share prices do not reach the level of the prices offered because 
the bidder offered an unjustifiably high premium in a particular transaction. Deepening our 
analysis, rather interestingly, we identify that the highest average bid premium was recorded 
in transactions involving bidders from developing countries and targets from developed 
economies. On the other hand, by examining the bid premium calculated at the +30 point in 
time, we identify a positive correlation with the competition level in the market for corporate 
control, as well as a strong influence of bidder and target country economic development on 
the determination of the bid premium amount. Additionally, we focus on and selected 
payment method as well as strategic vs. financial takeovers and find evidence of different 
behaviors in respect to the market conditions (different points in time) and institutional 
environments (space dimension) where M&A transactions are being conducted.  
Findings from our study mostly correlate to the empirical research body in the area of 
mergers and acquisitions. As an extension of this analysis, on one hand, a wider time 
frame ought to be introduced to verify the implications of the time frame proposition. On 
the other hand, a broader approach on transaction participants, especially on the bidders’ 
side would deepen the scope and quality of the research. The broader perspective would 
be expected to provide more evidence on the bid premium determinants and the 
willingness of the bidders to pay in an M&A transaction. 
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ZAŠTO PLATITI VIŠE – DETERMINANTE VREDNOSTI 
PREMIJA ZA PREUZIMANJE U MERDŢERIMA  
I AKVIZICIJAMA NA SVETSKOM NIVOU 
Merdžeri i akvizicije predstavljaju jednu od najdinamičnijih oblasti u svetu korporativnih 
finansija.Uspeh ovih izuzetno kompleksnih transakcija može varirati u zavisnosti od ekonomskog i 
institucionalnog okruženja u kojima se transakcije realizuju U ovom radu se analizira informacioni 
sadržaj premija za preuzimanje kao i razlike koje se javljaju u njihovim vrednostima u zavisnosti od: 
(1) posmatranog vremenskog okvira pre i nakon M&A transakcije (2) trenutnih kretanja na tržištima 
kapitala (3) karakteristika institucionalnog okruženja i nivoa ekonomske razvijenosti zemalja iz kojih 
učesnici u transakcijama potiču i (4) izabranog metoda plaćanja i motiva za ulazak u transakciju. Na 
uzorku od 783 merdžera i akvizicija realizovanih na globalnom nivou potvrđeno je da se visina 
premije za preuzimanje razlikuje u zavisnoti od posmatranog vremenskog okvira uz prisustvo 
fenomena “curenja” informacija kao i uz prisutno neprilagođavanja cena u ponudi cenama akcija 
targeta u vremenskom okviru +30. Vrednost premije za preuzimanje pod jakim je uticajem 
karakteristika instiucionalnog okruženja i nivoa ekonomskog razvoja zemalja iz kojih potiču 
preduzeća bidderi i targeti kao i pod uticajem metoda plaćanja i motiva za ulazak u M&A transakcije. 
U radu je pokazano da se rezultati često razlikuju u zavisnosti od toga da li su u analizu uključeni 
dominantni trendovi na najznačajnijim tržištima kapitala. 
Ključne reči: merdžeri, akvizicije, premija za preuzimanje, tržište za korporativnu kontrolu, 
institucionalno okruženje, metode plaćanja 
 
